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It has become evident that disturbances in shipping may have immediate and/or long-term effects  
leading to serious economic and political consequences. Under suitable conditions, the necessity of such 
disturbances can be quite easily motivated by proclaimed legitimate security concerns. That makes  
Sea Lines a potential instrument in Hybrid Conflicts. 
Since March 2018, Hybrid CoE/COI VR has taken a closer look at the Hybrid Threats vs. Sea Lines  
of Communication in a workstrand consisting of six events. During the process, it was found useful to 
propose a taxonomy of maritime hybrid threats that could be used to support various approaches, such as 
policy discussions aiming at national or EU/NATO-level responses, planning of operational level exercises  
as well as setting requirements for technologies. This handbook establishes a taxonomy of ten potential 
scenarios that were gradually developed and proof-tested during the workstrands. 
The Hybrid CoE Participating States advocate a strict adherence to international rules and norms.  
They must necessarily observe the legal framework in political or operational responses to what might 
be regarded as hybrid threats emerging at sea. Failing that, the consequences might be unintentional and 
harsh. Sometimes the events may require a rapid reaction, and decision-makers or maritime operators 
need to base their actions on limited information. In this handbook, ten scenarios are presented, each 
followed by a short legal analysis. This allows the reader to immediately get on the right track as regards 
relevant parts of Law of the Sea and International Humanitarian Law. 
Some findings deserve to be highlighted:
Firstly, for experts it seems to be easy to find unity concerning what can be done legally and what  
cannot. This is good news – the norms are clear enough. On the other hand, outside of a small circle of 
legal experts, this knowledge is seldom shared. There is a chance for confusion and even mistakes among 
those actors that remain poorly informed. Some feasible actions are regarded as acts of war and may  
as such lead to escalations. 
Secondly, the legal norms are ambiguous: sometimes two parties may find support for their conflicting 
positions from norms such as UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). This calls for 
readiness to defend one’s case with all possible international support.
Thirdly, the contemporary interpretation of International Humanitarian Law is quite relevant. Even a 
small-scale armed confrontation between two states may be regarded as an International Armed Conflict 
(IAC). In such a case, the countries are regarded as “belligerent” and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
replaces UNCLOS. This means that the Law on Naval Warfare would enter into force as well. 
Improving understanding of this legal context on all sides will increase predictability. 
I hope this handbook will help our Participating States, the EU and NATO by: 
1. Helping them to inform policymakers and maritime operators, such as naval and coast guard officers, 
on the legal context of possible maritime hybrid operations; and,
2. Providing a structure for policy and concept development, operational planning, exercises and
setting technical requirements.
I will use this opportunity to thank those who contributed in their respective fields throughout the work-
strand leading up to this publication. The legal scans were provided by a group of advisers on International 
Law: Professor Terry Gill, Jurist (Univ.) Valentin Schatz, Dr Tadas Jakstas and Dr Pirjo Kleemola-Juntunen. 
Professor Lauri Ojala provided insights on maritime logistics and the economy, and Ms Tiia Lohela kept the 
process running smoothly while also contributing to the texts. 
Professor Lauri Ojala, representing the University of Turku and the EU-funded ResQU2 project platform, 
contributed by rendering valuable knowledge and financial support to the events’ contents, arrangements 
and reporting. Also, the European Defence Agency (EDA) rendered important support by co-organising 
and co-financing two of the events. I am grateful to these partners who helped us in reaching this  
milestone.  
Finally, I also wish to thank the numerous participants in our events, where the ideas and ultimate  
scenarios were developed and tested.
In Helsinki, November 2019 
Capt (Navy), ret. Jukka Savolainen
Director, Community of Interest for Vulnerabilities and Resilience
Hybrid CoE
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BSR  Baltic Sea Region; political definition used by the EU, which includes Belarus,  
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the northern  
states of Germany and Northwest Russia
CISE  Common Information Sharing Environment (for EU fisheries management)
COI  Communities of Interest of Hybrid CoE; e.g. on Vulnerabilities and Resilience
COLREG  International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972; in force 1977)
EDA  European Defence Agency 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone (cf. a coastal state’s jurisdiction over its waters)
EUMSS  European Union Maritime Security Strategy
EUROSUR  European Border Surveillance System 
Hybrid CoE  The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
IAC  International armed conflict 
IHL  International Humanitarian Law; a set of rules that seek, for humanitarian reasons, 
to limit the effects of armed conflict
IMO  The International Maritime Organization, a United Nations-specialised agency 
having the role of global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and  
environmental performance of international shipping 
ITLOS  The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
LIVEX  An actual military exercise; “live exercise”, typically also using live ammunition
NOTMAR  “Notice to Mariners”; information or warning to (merchant) shipping operators 
and vessels issued by a Competent Authority
NSCMIG  North Sea and Channel Maritime Information Group
PSC  Political and Security Committee
ACRONYMSAND ABBREVIATIONS
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ResQU2  A project in the EU’s BSR Interreg Programme to increase preparedness and 
 coordination of operations in maritime and seaport emergencies (2018–2020)
San Remo Manual  The 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts 
 at Sea; adopted by The International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), which 
 is an independent, non-profit humanitarian organisation founded in 1970
SAR Convention  International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 
SLOC  Sea Lines of Communication
SOLAS  Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
SUA Convention  IMO Convention (1988) for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety  
 of Maritime Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the  
 Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf
TTX  Tabletop exercise
TS  Territorial Sea
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas from 10 December 1982 
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX).
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We live in an era of hybrid threats. Both state and 
non-state actors are challenging countries and 
institutions that they see as a threat, opponent or 
competitor to their interests and goals. The range 
of methods and activities at their disposal is broad, 
including influencing information; logistical weak-
nesses like energy supply pipelines; economic and 
trade-related blackmail; undermining international 
institutions by rendering rules ineffective; and  
terrorism or increasing insecurity.
Hybrid threats are methods and activities 
that target the vulnerabilities of the opponent. 
Vulnerabilities can be created by many things, 
including historical memory, legislation, old prac-
tices, geostrategic factors, strong polarisation of 
society, technological disadvantages or ideological 
differences. If the interests and goals of the user of 
hybrid methods and activities are not achieved, the 
situation can escalate into hybrid warfare, wherein 
the role of the military and violence will increase 
significantly.
Accordingly, Hybrid CoE characterises hybrid 
threat as
• Coordinated and synchronised action that
deliberately targets democratic states’ and
institutions’ systemic vulnerabilities, through
a wide range of means.
• The activities exploit the thresholds of
detection and attribution as well as different
interfaces (war-peace, internal-external, 
local-state, national-international, friend- 
 enemy).
• The aim of the activity is to influence different 
forms of decision making at the local (regional),
state or institutional level to favour and/or
obtain the agent’s strategic goals while
undermining and/or hurting the target.
Based on experience, hybrid influencing can  
be divided roughly into two phases: priming  
phase and operational phase. In the priming phase, 
the adversary constantly monitors the situation, 
exercising reasonably subtle means of influencing 
while gradually improving its assets. If decided, 
it may initiate a more serious hybrid operation 
whereby the effect of measures becomes stronger, 
the means more violent and plausible deniability 
decreases.1
Hybrid CoE/Community of Interest  
Vulnerabilities and Resilience (COI VR)
The key purpose of the work of Hybrid CoE/ 
COI Vulnerabilities and Resilience (COI VR) on 
maritime security has been to increase overall 
awareness of maritime hybrid threats, identify  
specific vulnerabilities and formulate actions to 
mitigate and counter such threats. The ultimate 
goal of the work is to increase the capabilities and 
resilience of the participating Member States  
and organisations. 
The work of COI VR on the maritime strand 
covers: 
• The Workshop on Harbour Protection in
the Hybrid Threat Environment, which was
organised jointly with the European Defence
Agency (EDA) in its Brussels premises on
29–30 May 2018,
• The International Symposium on Maritime
Security, which was organised jointly with the
Helmut Schmidt Defence University in
Hamburg on 4–5 September 2018,
• Conference on Legal Resilience in an Era of
Hybrid Threats, organised jointly by Hybrid
CoE together with the University of Exeter,
in which COI VR hosted a panel on Shipping 
1. INTRODUCTION –
AN ERA OF HYBRID THREATS
1  The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, “Hybrid threats”, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats/
12 
through the Sea of Azov, on 8–10 April 2019 
in the United Kingdom, 
• The Workshop on Hybrid Scenarios in the
Baltic Sea, organised in cooperation with the
ResQU2 project in the Turku Archipelago,
Finland, on 28–29 May 2019,
• The Workshop on Harbour Protection, 
organised in cooperation with the European
Defence Agency (EDA) and Project Platform- 
ResQU2, on 15–16 October 2019 in Finland.
In the course of the COI VR work, several key pat-
terns that could emerge as hybrid threats to Sea 
Lines of Communications (SLOC) were discovered. 
Potential proactive and countering measures were 
explored, especially at the international political 
level, while not overlooking strategic and opera-
tional-level recommendations. Business models 
in the shipping industry and wider logistics chains 
were discussed together with existing community- 
level approaches to the topic, when appropriate.
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2. SETTING THE SCENE –  
MARITIME DOMAIN 
Threats in the maritime domain tend to be pro-
gressively hybrid in nature and difficult to model 
on account of their complex appearance and 
cascading nature. These cascading effects pose 
particularly serious dangers since they exploit the 
vulnerabilities of different systems and/or spheres 
at the same time in an interdependent manner. 
Furthermore, the effects tend to become magni-
fied rather quickly through global supply chains. 
Thus, societal systems, such as securing SLOC  
and maintaining a high level of maritime safety  
and security, are increasingly connected and  
interdependent. 
In this section, some of the factors playing a key 
role in the maritime sphere, and thus in maritime 
hybrid threats, are elaborated upon.
2.1 Rapid digitalisation process and  
interconnectivity of the naval world
The pace of technological development in maritime 
systems, including navigational, surveillance and 
other operational systems, has been rapid. In addi-
tion, ubiquitous and all-pervasive digitisation and 
digitalisation2 have been quick to penetrate the 
merchant marine as well as the naval world. This 
process comprises a range of elements, including 
i) connected assets; ii) human analytics; iii) remote 
presence and assets management; and iv) big data 
analytics. 
Rapid digitalisation of the port processes, 
including the entire logistics chain, has been the 
current trend. This, in turn, exposes new potential 
vulnerabilities in terms of hybrid operations, as 
the opportunities and likelihood for cyberattacks, 
for example on ships or in critical ports, increases 
drastically. At worst, this kind of attack could cause 
economic losses worth billions.
Particularly, situations where a large discrepan-
cy exists between different operators’ level of 
technological maturity and know-how regarding 
operating the systems create great vulnerabilities 
in the hybrid context. Operators using common or 
shared platforms – such as authorities’ or seaports’ 
systems – for a certain type of data exchange  
may become vulnerable to cyberattacks or other 
malicious activities through loopholes. 
This development has also been witnessed in 
several recent cyberattacks, which have usually 
been targeted elsewhere, but the maritime com-
munity may also have been seriously affected,  
reportedly by way of “collateral damage” (see,  
e.g. Kiiski 2018). A similar pattern can also be  
observed among authorities, such as maritime, 
coast guard and naval authorities, who operate at 
different levels of IT maturity within the EU, not  
to mention globally. The entire port community 
must recognise this trend and seek the necessary 
solutions to maintain and improve resilience.
Furthermore, in many countries competent  
authorities have very tight budgets, and hence, 
bringing state-of-the-art technology into wide-
spread operational use is not easy. Some capabili-
ties also seem to be in short supply in many coun-
tries, such as advanced underwater surveillance 
equipment and systems, the capacity to analyse 
sensor data (so-called Big Data Analytics) and  
the means to leap into digitalised Vessel Traffic 
Management systems, for example.
This situation needs to be seen against the 
backdrop of recent developments in European as 
well as worldwide waters: one seems to be wit-
nessing a deteriorating scenario of hybrid threats, 
which have already included the use of cyberat-
tacks, Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) tactics and  
 
2 As defined by Gartner, digitisation refers to the process of changing from analogue to digital form, whereas digitalisation refers to the use of digital 
technologies to change a business or an operations model and provide new revenue and value-producing or other opportunities; in other words, it is  
the process of moving to digital operations.
14 
submarine/underwater arms systems. As a whole, 
the highly interconnected and delicate maritime 
community forms an entity in which imbalances 
are creating easy targets and entry points for  
exploitation and hostile activities.
In order to prevent and respond to these  
activities, intensification of the exchange of  
information at national and international levels  
(including speedy implementation of CISE)  
and structured implementation of existing EU 
requirements (e.g. EUMSS) are required. Confi-
dence-building measures and regular exchange/
interconnection of situational pictures between 
partners (e.g. NSCMIG; EUROSUR) are just some 
examples of the work that could be done in this 
respect. 
2.2 The economic impacts of maritime  
hybrid threats
Sea Lines of Communications are also subject to 
various types of natural and/or man-made disrup-
tions. Severe weather conditions typically affect 
available and safe SLOCs or seaport capacities 
for a relatively short period of time, i.e. days rath-
er than weeks. Some man-made actions, such as 
enduring strikes, establishing control zones or 
blocking SLOCs, however, may affect shipping for 
several weeks or even months.
As a general rule, the shorter the incident or 
disruption affecting SLOCs, shipping or ports, the 
smaller its economic impact. If the duration of the 
disruption grows longer, the direct and indirect 
economic consequences tend to grow expo- 
nentially, which is exemplified below:
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC IMPACTS
Direct economic losses of:
e.g. higher rates, loss of capacity, longer transit
Shipping industry 
Seaport industry 
Cargo owners 
Ultimately the consumers
Indirect impacts:
Supply chain delays
Supply chain shortages
More complex materials management
Need for alternative:
Routes and/or transport modes
Procurement sources
NATIONAL & REGIONAL ECONOMY IMPACTS 
Impact on economic activity
Increased uncertainty and need for contingency planning 
and actions 
Security of Supply issues 
Possible need for intervention on: 
Shipping supply/demand 
Facilitation of alternative routes or modes 
Other actions by authorities
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The economic impact of delays for shippers (i.e. 
cargo owners) varies significantly depending on, 
e.g. the value and perishability or criticality of
goods as well as on the required transport dis-
tance. For example, Hummels and Schaur (20133) 
have estimated that a supply chain delay of one
day equals an ad valorem customs tariff of 0.6%
to 2.1%. The lower boundary typically refers to
low-valued and non-perishable goods, while the
upper boundary typically refers to high-value, crit-
ical and/or perishable goods. This means that even
relatively minor disturbances to supply chains
may cause significant direct and indirect economic 
costs or losses for various economic stakeholders.
Depending on, e.g. the severity, duration and 
geographical coverage of a disruption, the market 
for transport and other logistics service provision 
adapts to the situation in various ways, which are 
exemplified in Figure X. 
The demand for transport and other logistics 
services stems from the demand generated among 
trading parties, i.e. economic entities selling and 
buying goods. As such, the supply of logistics 
services is also constantly being adapted to meet 
changing market needs in “business as usual”  
situations. This adaptive behaviour also occurs 
during disruptions, where the price for logistics 
services may increase rapidly and significantly if 
the demand exceeds the available capacity.
2.3 Legal and contractual issues  
pertaining to the maritime domain 
Recent developments, such as those in and around 
the Sea of Azov and in the Strait of Hormuz in the 
spring and summer of 2019, have clearly demon-
strated how security measures at sea and the dis-
turbance of shipping may have immediate and/or 
long-term effects on the economy. Some of these 
security measures have been justified on the basis 
of the rights granted in international law. Thus, it 
has become evident that these kinds of methods 
may be used as a potential instrument tool in a 
hybrid conflict.
For experts, it seems to be easy to find unity 
concerning what can and cannot lawfully be done – 
the norms are clear enough. On the other hand, 
outside of a small circle of real legal experts, this 
knowledge is seldom shared. There is a chance for 
3 David L. Hummels and Georg Schaur, “Time as a Trade Barrier”, American Economic Review 103, no. 7 (December 2013): 2935–59
FIGURE X. Simplification of how the supply of logistics service provision adapts to disruptions.
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confusion and even mistakes among those actors 
that remain poorly informed. There are a few 
potential situations where two parties may both 
resort to rights based on the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A good example is 
the right of a state to use another state’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) for naval exercises while all 
other nations have the right to free navigation.  
In such a situation where these rights are being  
set against one another, any nation should be well 
prepared to promote its own cause with the sup-
port of its allies and partners in international for  
a, such as the EU, NATO and the UN.
There is a compelling need to study the inter-
national legal regime of the sea, such as UNCLOS, 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts 
at Sea and Maritime Law, in a hybrid context due 
to the complex interplay between them. These 
legal frameworks sometimes produce surprising 
interpretations of what is allowed and what is not 
allowed in international and/or territorial waters.
To be able to prevent and/or counter maritime 
hybrid threats effectively and in a timely manner, 
political-level audiences as well as competent 
authorities tasked to secure SLOCs and critical 
maritime infrastructure need to be informed about 
the type of potential hybrid operations exploiting 
the interface of legally permitted or prohibited 
activities, respectively. To this end, the Handbook 
on Maritime Hybrid Threats aims to provide a better 
understanding of the existing international legal 
framework relevant in hybrid operations. 
2.4. Towards the Handbook on Maritime  
Hybrid Threats; the Workshop on Hybrid 
Scenarios in the Baltic Sea
The Handbook builds on previous maritime secu-
rity activities of Hybrid CoE/COI VR, and particu-
larly on the Workshop on Hybrid Scenarios in the 
Baltic Sea, which was organised jointly by Hybrid 
CoE and the maritime and seaport safety and  
security project platform ResQU2 and its lead 
partner, the University of Turku, in Finland, on 
28–29 May 2019.
The workshop brought together experts, stake-
holders and key decision-makers from the political, 
military and academic spheres. In the workshop, 
participants were asked to focus on the dependen-
cies, vulnerabilities and needs of Baltic Sea neigh-
bouring countries that are EU Member States 
and/or NATO members in view of maritime hybrid 
threats. The aim was to strengthen the resilience 
and a comprehensive understanding of and re-
sponse to threats exploiting maritime vulnerabili-
ties in the region.
During the workshop, multiple potential hybrid 
threat scenarios with realistic charts and shipping 
routes were discussed. Scenarios referred to po-
tential economic and political losses, and UNCLOS 
and other relevant parts of international law were 
revisited in all cases. Each scenario contained a 
legal opinion covering the main legal issues and 
responses in relation to the scenario. 
Legal opinions were prepared by three legal ex-
perts. Naturally, the legal points of view were only 
a condensed version of an actual judicial assess-
ment that would be needed in a real case. How-
ever, the legal opinions effectively highlighted the 
interpretational complexities between legal norms 
of various types and scope and between actual or 
possible jurisdictions involved.
The workshop produced recommendations 
based on commonly identified requirements and 
demands affecting both public- and private-sector 
stakeholders and covering political, economic, 
social, technological, environmental, legal and mili-
tary concerns. Thus, solid policy recommendations 
at a national as well as a European level could be 
provided. 
The workshop’s findings also partially contrib-
uted to high-level, scenario-based policy discus-
sions on countering hybrid threats, which were 
organised in July and September of 2019 by the 
Finnish Presidency for the Council of the EU.  
In addition, the scenarios were presented to the 
EU PSC Ambassadors in the autumn of 2019. 
17 
The following section covers topical and realistic 
maritime hybrid threat scenarios, which have been 
carefully constructed by a team of legal and logis-
tics experts and Hybrid CoE/COI VR. The scenar-
ios have been put together in expert meetings in 
Helsinki and Brussels in the course of the spring 
and summer of 2019.
Each of the scenarios describes a security 
measure hampering shipping. The attached  
legal scans put the developments in a valid legal 
framework.
Scenario 1. Protection of an underwater  
gas pipeline
Weather conditions in the sea involve a storm 
from the south-east. A large bulk carrier has a 
blackout and it starts drifting into the EEZ of 
Country Theta, which is an EU coastal state. Emer-
gency anchorage is necessary because the vessel 
cannot remain on the windward side, or else it 
risks shifting its load. The vessel’s anchor holds 
badly, and the vessel starts to drift slightly. When 
drifting stops, the ship is more or less above an 
underwater gas pipeline belonging to Corporation 
Eta, the majority ownership of which is in Country 
Cronen. After some hours, the problem is fixed, 
the anchor is raised and the vessel moves on.
Two days later, the majority owner of the pipe-
line Corporation Eta from Country Cronen, with 
the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Country Cronen, approaches the government of 
Country Theta. They demand that Country Theta 
cover the cost of the pipeline inspection and possi-
ble repairs. They argue that Country Theta should 
have protected the pipeline by not attempting 
anchorage next to it and/or should have arranged 
for towage to help before and during the raising of 
the anchor.
Can Corporation Eta hold Country Theta liable 
for damage caused by the bulk carrier in distress 
within the EEZ/on the continental shelf of Country 
Theta?
3. MARITIME SCENARIOS
SCENARIO 1. Protection of an underwater gas pipeline
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Legal scan of Scenario 1. Protection  
of an underwater gas pipeline
Corporation Eta, the owner of the underwater 
pipeline, with the support of the government of 
Country Cronen, seeks to hold the government of 
Country Theta liable for damage caused by a bulk 
carrier in distress within the EEZ/on the continen-
tal shelf of Country Theta.
Corporation Eta and Country Cronen base the 
claim on an alleged violation by Country Theta of 
a coastal state obligation to ensure the safety of 
pipelines. In order for the claim to be successful, 
such an obligation would have to exist under public 
international law. Such an obligation, which in any 
case would be an obligation of due diligence that 
requires only reasonable efforts on behalf of the 
coastal state and not an absolute prevention of 
harm, does not exist.
There is an obligation on the part of coastal 
states to have due regard for the right of other 
states to lay submarine cables and pipelines  
(Article 56(2) UNCLOS) and to not impede the 
laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines 
(Article 79(2) UNCLOS).
The coastal state does not even have the nec-
essary rights to fulfil such an obligation, as it only 
has the right to take reasonable measures for the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
pipelines, not a general right to ensure the safety 
of the pipeline from international shipping.
Measures to protect submarine cables in the 
EEZ against damage by international shipping fall 
within the responsibility (and exclusive rights) of 
flag states and the states of nationality of the per-
sons involved (Articles 58(2), 113 of UNCLOS). 
Therefore, Country Theta has not violated any 
international obligations and does not bear inter-
national responsibility.
Neither Corporation Eta nor Country Cronen 
can hold Country Theta liable for the damage 
caused by the EU-flagged ship’s anchoring.
Scenario 2. Cyber-attacks against shipping
The focal vessel is a tanker registered in the EU 
Member State of Zeta and owned by a company 
headquartered in a non-EU Member State named 
Rho, which is not a party to UNCLOS. When ap-
proaching an oil terminal in the EU Member State 
of Alpha, the vessel loses steering and engine con-
trol, the engines go full speed ahead and the ship 
crashes into a mooring station for an oil terminal. 
As a result, the mooring station is seriously dam-
aged, and the tanker sustains a minor oil leak.
After two weeks, specialists find advanced 
malware in the ship’s computer systems and an 
installed communication link allowing for external 
SCENARIO 2. Cyber-attacks against shipping
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steering. As a result, insurance companies for the 
ship claim no responsibility for the crash based on 
their cyber disclaimer.
After three weeks, some criminal actors black-
mail another shipping company, demanding 
10 million EUR for revealing the names of other 
ships where the same malware has been installed. 
After four weeks, attribution to a state actor 
(Country Cronen) is discussed and a majority of 
EU and NATO governments release statements 
attributing blame to Country Cronen, statements 
which are deemed credible based on evidence and 
intelligence.
Has Country Cronen violated international law?
Legal scan of Scenario 2. Cyber-attacks 
against shipping
In order to constitute a violation of a rule of public 
international law, which in turn would constitute 
an internationally wrongful act, one which engages 
the responsibility of that state, the cyberattack 
must first of all be attributable to Country Cronen.
Attribution is always a challenge in such cases, 
but it is not invariably an insurmountable obstacle. 
However, attributing legal responsibility requires 
a fairly high degree of certainty, and this is not 
always possible.
The question is, thus, whether specific cyber 
acts could convincingly be attributed to either a 
state (a governmental agency such as the armed 
forces, intelligence service, etc.) or to a group of 
identifiable individuals operating at the behest of 
and under the direction of a state (so-called “patri-
otic hacktivists”). In the scenario at hand, attribu-
tion is assumed to be possible.
Therefore, the second question is whether 
there are international obligations that prohibit 
cyberattacks on navigation. The international 
law of the sea, and UNCLOS in particular, do not 
explicitly deal with cyber-security issues such as 
cyberattacks on ships. However, interference with 
a merchant ship’s navigation and damage to that 
merchant ship constitute a violation of UNCLOS, 
depending on where the ship is located at the time 
of the attack.
If the ship is located on the high seas or in an EEZ, 
a cyberattack by a state violates the flag state’s 
freedom of navigation, respectively, under Article 
87(1)(a) or Article 58(1) of UNCLOS. In the terri-
torial sea, the right of innocent passage comes into 
play (Article 17 of UNCLOS), as does the coastal 
state’s sovereignty (Article 2(1) UNCLOS).
The attack might potentially also violate vari-
ous other obligations concerning safety at sea aris-
ing from treaties, such as the 1972 International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COL-
REGs). If the cyberattack also causes an oil spill or 
other form of marine pollution, it violates the ob-
ligation to protect the marine environment under 
Article 192 of UNCLOS. Equally, damage caused 
to port facilities following a cyberattack on a ship 
constitutes an internationally wrongful act.
Apart from the law of the sea, two further con-
siderations must be taken into account.
Firstly, in the Tallinn Manual 2.04 experts iden-
tified the existence of a rule of customary interna-
tional law prohibiting (cyber) acts that violate the 
sovereignty of another state (Rule 4, Tallinn Manual 
2.0). This rule is based on state practice, UN res-
olutions and various decisions by international 
courts and tribunals. Notwithstanding the view 
expressed by some states that sovereignty is sim-
ply a foundational principle and not a rule of inter-
national law in itself that can be violated, it is prob-
able that the majority position of states is reflected 
in the Tallinn Manual rule. Hence, a cyber act that 
violates the sovereignty of a state would consti-
tute a violation of customary international law in 
addition to the violations of UNCLOS referred to 
above. By preventing the flag state from exercis-
ing its exclusive jurisdiction and control over the 
navigation of the vessel, the act violated the sov-
ereignty of the flag state. If the act occurred in the 
TS of a coastal state it would additionally violate 
the sovereignty of that state as well. This would 
strengthen the case of the injured state(s).
Secondly, the question arises whether the cy-
ber act constituted a use of force. Here, as stated, 
it is a matter for careful consideration and the 
positions of experts and states are not uniform, 
4  Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
20 
hence conclusions are debatable. But it should 
be noted that many states and experts take the 
position that a cyber act that results in physical 
damage to objects and/or (potential) injury to 
persons constitutes a use of force in violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. For example, in the 
previously mentioned Tallinn Manual, the experts 
unanimously took the position that subject to a 
de minimis threshold, “consequences involving 
physical harm to individuals or property will in and 
of themselves qualify a cyber operation as a use 
of force”.5 On the basis of the characterisation of 
the damage to the mooring station as “serious”, it 
would seem likely that the de minimis threshold has 
been met. Note also that even if one were to con-
clude this act constituted a use of force, the ma-
jority position of states and experts would almost 
certainly not characterise it as an “armed attack” 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Hence, any re-
sponse would have to be confined to the utilisation 
of settlement procedures in pursuance of a claim 
for damage arising from the incident. These could 
potentially be complemented by acts of retorsion 
and/or non-forceful countermeasures subject to  
the procedural rules governing the imposition of 
countermeasures (see Annex on Legal Responses).
Scenario 3. Clandestine use of underwater 
weapons
During the previous six weeks, three explosions 
sank two vessels owned by the EU Member States 
of Alpha and Beta (one of which is also a NATO 
country) en route to a port in Country Alpha, re-
spectively. Two buoyant WWII contact mines are 
detected by surveillance planes and eliminated by 
the Navy.
One week after the latest explosion, the  
government of Country Zeta released technical 
evidence compromising the assumption about old 
contact mines: all damage was deeper under the 
hull, near the stern, and all explosions hit the en-
gine room. After two weeks, attribution claims are 
presented against Country Cronen based on cir-
cumstantial satellite evidence. All parties also con-
tinue widespread efforts to find more evidence on 
the seabed. Country Cronen regards these claims 
as a serious offence against itself.
What are the consequences if attribution is 
seriously made to a state actor (Country Cronen)?
Has Country Cronen violated international 
law?
SCENARIO 3. Clandestine use of underwater weapons
5 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, Commentary to Rule 69 on p. 334.
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SCENARIO 4. Shooting and exercise area declared dangerous and blocking SLOCs
Legal scan of Scenario 3. Clandestine use  
of underwater weapons
The clandestine use of underwater weapons re-
sulting in (potential) damage to vessels and/or inju-
ry or loss of life to the crew of the vessels crosses 
the line from interference to actual use of force 
under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The planting of any such explosive devices on 
board a vessel at sea or in port by individuals not 
in state service would bring the 1988 SUA Con-
vention and, as far as applicable, its 2005 Protocol 
into play. This provides for criminal jurisdiction and 
international legal cooperation in suppressing acts 
directed against the safety of maritime navigation.
Proceeding on the assumption that the use 
of clandestine weapons in peacetime is directly 
attributable to a state, such activities should also 
be incompatible with the prohibition of the use of 
force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the ob-
ligation to use the high seas/EEZ only for peaceful 
purposes under Articles 88 and 301 in conjunction 
with 58(2) of UNCLOS, and finally the freedom 
of navigation in the high seas/EEZ under Articles 
87(1) and 58(1) of UNCLOS.
This could potentially be a matter for the UN 
Security Council or other international organisa-
tions, such as NATO or the EU, acting within their 
scope of authority under the UN Charter and their 
constituent instruments. While sporadic acts of 
force not resulting in significant harm or injury 
would probably fall short of an “armed attack” 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter, they would 
nevertheless constitute a serious violation of inter-
national law and would result in the responsibility 
of the state in question.
If the damage were more serious and/or result-
ed in human casualties, the line between a “hybrid” 
and a direct threat would be crossed and the right 
of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and customary law would come into the picture.
Scenario 4. Shooting and exercise area  
declared dangerous and blocking SLOCs
Country Cronen declares a shooting and exercise 
area dangerous and blocks a sea route to a port 
of EU Member State Beta, which is also a NATO 
member. An intense LIVEX, including the use of 
various arms systems, has been ongoing for two 
weeks and is situated in the vicinity involving 
merchant vessels navigating through the area. As 
a result, ferry and liner shipping lines have halted 
their ships, and some companies have suspended 
activities. The disruption of SLOCs also affects EU 
Member State Alpha. Exercises are to continue 
until further notice.
Has Country Cronen violated international law?
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Legal scan of Scenario 4. Declaring  
a shooting and exercise area and blocking 
SLOCs
Military exercises in the territorial sea of another 
state, as presented in this scenario, are completely 
illegal because they constitute a violation of the 
sovereignty of the coastal state in the territorial 
sea (Article 2(1) of UNCLOS). They are in breach 
of the regime of innocent passage (see Article 
19(1) and 19(2)(b), (e), (f), (l) of UNCLOS). Insofar 
as they also affect the navigation of vessels of  
third states, the right of innocent passage of  
those states has also been violated (Article 17  
of UNCLOS).
Military exercises on the high seas and in the 
EEZ do not per se violate the peaceful purposes 
clauses in Articles 88 and 301 of UNCLOS. Those 
provisions do not result in a prohibition of all 
military activities on the high seas and in EEZs, 
only those that threaten or use force in a manner 
inconsistent with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
However, states conducting military activities on 
the high seas or in the EEZ of other states must, 
under Articles 87(2) and 58(3) of UNCLOS, have 
due regard for the rights and obligations of other 
states and of the coastal state, respectively.
In essence, these due regard obligations re-
quire that the state takes all necessary measures 
to ensure that its military activities do not under-
mine the rights and obligations of other states. In 
other words, the interference in the rights of other 
states must be as slight as possible and must be 
commensurate with the military exercise.
Aspects that have a direct bearing on the pro-
portionality of the operations are, among others:
(1) the extent of the area of military exercises,
(2) the duration of the exercises,
(3) the severity of the restrictions imposed on 
 the rights of other states,
(4) the availability of less intrusive alternatives, 
 and
(5) the extent, timeliness and accuracy of the 
 notification (e.g. to NOTMAR) to affected 
 states.
In addition, it is obvious that such an exercise may 
not involve any use of force against foreign vessels 
unless a vessel or aircraft posed an immediate 
threat to the vessels conducting exercises in the 
exercise zone.
Bearing in mind that live-fire military exercises 
blocked Country Beta’s only port (and potentially 
one port of EU Member State Alpha), with poten-
tially significant economic losses, and disrupted 
major civilian (e.g. ferry) shipping lanes and that 
the navigational warning procedures were not 
properly executed (i.e. civilian ships were not 
notified about the duration of the exercise, and 
therefore, were not able to prepare in advance for 
disruptions), the naval exercises clearly violated 
the abovementioned obligations. In addition, fur-
ther analysis of the relevant circumstances could 
be required to ascertain, for example:
1)  the size of the area of Country Beta’s exclusive 
 economic zone that was declared dangerous  
 for shipping due to the military exercises;
2) how many civilian ships had to stop operations  
 or change the course of their navigation due  
 to the military exercises and how substantial 
 the diversion was compared to the original 
 route;
3) whether the other routes that the ships had  
 to use due to the military exercises were  
 equally safe and secure; and
4) whether there were any other negative  
 consequences on unrestricted navigation in  
 the sea, such as failure to deliver cargo on time, 
 extra costs incurred in changing course and 
 disruption of the operations of seaports in  
 Country Beta and Country Alpha, in particular.
Scenario 5. Declaration of a control zone 
around one of the islands in the sea
Country Cronen declares a control zone in the sea 
region around one of the islands belonging to EU 
Member State Alpha, with implicit impacts also on 
EU Member State Theta, claiming the following as 
the motivation for such action:
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SCENARIO 5. Declaration of a control zone around one of the islands in the sea
i) an anti-terrorist operation in the area;
ii) an armed conflict elsewhere outside the 
sea region;
iii)  an armed conflict elsewhere within the sea 
region;
iv)  a unilaterally declared (by the offender) armed
conflict with the host nation; or
v) a bilaterally declared armed conflict.
Has Country Cronen violated international law?
Legal scan of Scenario 5. Declaration of 
a control zone around an island
i) An anti-terrorist operation in the area
The imposition of a control zone in peacetime 
around any island would be incompatible with in-
ternational law regardless of whether it was based 
on an anti-terrorist operation or on other grounds. 
Such a zone would be in violation of the sovereign-
ty of the affected territorial state, of the sovereign-
ty of the coastal state in its territorial sea (Article 
2(1) of UNCLOS), and of the sovereign rights of 
the coastal state in its EEZ and on its continental 
shelf (Articles 56(1) and 77(1) of UNCLOS).
In addition, it would constitute an impermis-
sible intervention into the domestic affairs of the 
affected state and, if coupled with the threat or 
actual use of armed force, would constitute a use 
of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Char-
ter and, if rising above a small-scale armed incident 
not resulting in significant material damage or inju-
ry, would also amount to an “armed attack” trigger-
ing the right of individual or collective self-defence 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter along with 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and/or Art. 42(7) of 
the EU Treaty, as the case may be.
As far as other states exercising navigational 
rights in peacetime are concerned, the control 
zone violates the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea (Article 17 of UNCLOS) and the 
freedom of navigation under Article 58(1) of  
UNCLOS.
ii) An armed conflict elsewhere outside the 
sea region; and
iii) An armed conflict elsewhere within the 
sea region
In these sub-scenarios, there is as yet no armed 
conflict in progress between the state imposing 
the “control zone” and the affected territorial 
state; hence, the law of armed conflict is not ap-
plicable to the situation until such time as actual 
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force is employed by either state against the other. 
The affected territorial state has the status of a 
neutral state vis-a ̀-vis the armed conflict ongoing 
elsewhere, unless it has become a party to the con-
flict by engaging in hostilities against a belligerent 
state or by providing direct combat support to a 
belligerent state.
As a neutral state, its territory is inviolable and 
may not be interfered with or entered by a bellig-
erent party, except in the event of a serious vio-
lation of neutrality. Thus, the result is largely the 
same as in sub-scenario i).
iv)  A unilaterally declared (by the offender) 
 armed conflict with the host nation; or
v) A bilaterally declared armed conflict
In these sub-scenarios, the situation is different 
assuming that the declaration of a state of armed 
conflict was either a formal declaration of war or 
resulted in actual hostilities. In either case, the 
law of armed conflict would become applicable 
and would apply to all belligerent states equally, 
irrespective of other legal considerations, such as 
which state is the aggressor or is lawfully exercis-
ing self-defence. It operates alongside other bodies 
of law, including the law of the sea, human rights 
law and other treaties and bodies of law.
To the extent that the obligations arising from 
more than one body of law are compatible and are 
applicable to the situation at hand, both bodies 
of law will be given full application. If a conflict of 
obligation should arise, the more specific rule will 
take precedence. In most, but not all, cases, this 
will mean that the rule of the law of armed conflict 
will take precedence over rules of more general 
application.
During an international armed conflict, the law 
of naval warfare is applicable between belligerent 
states. This enables belligerent states to conduct 
attacks against lawful military objectives of the 
enemy state (e.g. warships, military aircraft and 
military installations, such as barracks, naval bases 
and military airfields) and engage in measures of  
 
control and denial of enemy coasts through block-
ades and similar measures aimed at interdicting 
commerce.
There are detailed rules on how such measures 
must be conducted. Most of them are now a mat-
ter of customary law, as the conventions on naval 
warfare dating from the beginning of the 20th 
century are now largely outdated. An authoritative 
guide to the contemporary law of naval warfare 
can be found in the San Remo Manual on the Law of 
Armed Conflict at Sea (1994), currently in the pro-
cess of being updated.6
However, setting out these rules in detail goes 
beyond the scope of this condensed legal analysis. 
The rights of third states not party to the armed 
conflict are regulated in the law of neutrality and 
the law of naval warfare.
Scenario 6A. WIDE Force Protection Areas
Country Cronen declares that its Navy is on full 
alert and reserves the right to force protection by 
use of arms against any approaching sea or air-
borne targets. Merchant ships cannot easily avoid 
the force protection zones. After 12 hours, two 
merchant ships are fired upon by light cannons, 
and they turn back. After three days, the zones are 
maintained, and traffic has halted.
Has Country Cronen violated international law?
Legal scan of Scenario 6A. WIDE Force  
Protection Areas
The imposition of a wide “force protection zone” 
by Country Cronen, particularly in sea areas 
where navigation and access to a number of states 
would be impeded or denied due to geographical 
circumstances, such as narrow straits, is without 
any doubt unlawful. Such actions would breach 
the right to innocent passage in the territorial sea 
(Article 17 of UNCLOS) and the freedom of navi-
gation in the EEZ (Article 58(1) of UNCLOS).
In addition, a wide “force protection zone”, as 
indicated in the scenario, would potentially breach 
due regard obligations (Article 58(3) of UNCLOS) 
not only with respect to the sovereign rights of the 
6 The San Remo Manual was adopted by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (IIHL), which is an independent, non-profit humanitarian 
organisation based in San Remo, Italy.
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SCENARIO 6A. WIDE Force Protection Areas
coastal state to explore and exploit, conserve and 
manage the natural resources of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone as well as to engage in other  
activities for the economic exploitation and ex-
ploration of the zone, but also the freedoms that 
all states enjoy in the exclusive economic zone of 
another state. These include freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight, the freedom to lay submarine 
cables and pipelines, and other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of 
ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, 
and compatible with the other provisions of the 
Convention (Articles 58 and 87 of UNCLOS). If 
the zone covers parts of a coastal state’s territorial 
sea, it would also violate that coastal state’s sover-
eignty (Article 2(1) of UNCLOS).
If such zones were enforced by treating any 
intrusion as grounds for automatically opening fire, 
it would constitute a serious violation of interna-
tional law in a number of ways (violation of the law 
relating to the use of force under Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter, violation of human rights law, etc.).
While states have the right to conduct mili-
tary exercises in international waters and/or take 
reasonable measures of protection (see analysis 
concerning Scenario 4), this must be conducted 
in a way that pays full attention to the due regard 
requirement for vessels operating in the EEZ of 
another state, does not impede free navigation and 
does not involve the indiscriminate use of force. 
The zone as described here is in violation of all of 
these criteria.
In the event that such a zone were implement-
ed, the affected states would be within their rights 
to provide protection to vessels sailing under their 
national flag and could operate joint patrols to 
ensure safe and unimpeded navigation, while tak-
ing into account any reasonable measures of pro-
tection (i.e. a safety zone that others were notified 
of in advance, that was of a temporary nature and 
that did not have the effect of denying free navi-
gation or the exercise of the coastal state’s rights 
within its own EEZ). Such measures could be taken 
alongside traditional diplomatic and economic 
measures of retorsion or countermeasures in the 
event of ongoing interference.
Scenario 6B. NARROW Force Protection 
Areas
After international reactions, the force protection 
zones in Scenario 6A are reduced in size, and in 
most cases, can easily be avoided by merchant 
ships. After 12 hours, two merchant ships are fired 
upon by light cannons, and they turn back.
Has Country Cronen violated international law?
26   
SCENARIO 6B. NARROW Force Protection Areas
SCENARIO 7A. Ship Inspection Zone in front of countries Alpha and Beta
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Legal scan of Scenario 6B.  
NARROW Force Protection Areas
Military exercises and activities are not illegal 
under the conditions analysed in the context of 
Scenario 4. However, “Force Protection Areas” in 
which vessels will be indiscriminately fired upon 
are completely illegal (see Scenario 6A), and in 
this scenario two merchant ships have been illegal-
ly fired upon (again, see Scenario 6A).
Scenario 7A. Ship Inspection Zone in  
front of countries Alpha and Beta
Country Cronen establishes a control zone where 
ships bound to two EU Member States (Country 
Alpha and Country Beta, the latter of which is also 
a NATO member) are stopped and searched by 
Country Cronen’s navy and/or coast guard. The 
motivation for these acts, as announced by Coun-
try Cronen, is a suspected terrorist threat against 
undefined strategic targets.
Ships are subjected to random controls cov-
ering approximately 10% of all vessels within the 
control zone. Delays ranging from five hours to 
two days ensue; the average waiting time per ves-
sel is 20 hours.
The first reaction by Country Alpha and Coun-
try Beta is to immediately protest the actions. Both 
countries (Alpha and Beta) send one coast guard 
vessel each to the site and heighten their naval and 
air force readiness.
After one week, the controls established by 
Country Cronen continue. Country Cronen shows 
evidence of explosives and WMDs found on board 
one Asian-registered ship. This is widely publicised 
on all of Country Cronen’s media channels. Coun-
try Cronen declares that it will have to continue 
controls until further notice and possibly intensify 
them.
After three weeks, the controls established by 
Country Cronen have increased to cover approx-
imately 20% of traffic. This increases the average 
delay per vessel to two days.
Country Cronen demands that Country Alpha 
and Country Beta allow controls to be made in 
their territorial waters for shelter purposes, de-
pending on wind speed and direction.
Has Country Cronen violated international law?
Legal scan of Scenario 7A: Ship Inspection 
Zone in front of countries Alpha and Beta
A “Ship Inspection Zone” outside of internal waters 
off the coast of any state is unlawful under UN-
CLOS and the customary international law of the 
sea. It would clearly be in violation of:
– freedom of navigation in the EEZ (Article 58(1)
of UNCLOS; the right of visit under Article 110
in conjunction with Article 58(2) of UNCLOS
does not apply),
– the rights of innocent passage of ships passing
through the territorial sea in this area
(Article 17 of UNCLOS), and
– the coastal states’ sovereignty (Article 2(1) of
UNCLOS);
– insofar as EEZ areas are affected, there is also
likely a violation of the obligation to show due
regard to the rights and obligations of the
coastal state under Article 58(3) of UNCLOS.
In the event of sporadic interference of a relatively 
minor nature, diplomatic measures and possible 
claims potentially combined with countermeasures 
(see above, under Scenario 1.2) aimed at halting 
further interference and providing reparations 
would be the normal response. If persistent and/or 
more invasive measures of control were exercised 
by a state in international waters, the state(s) af-
fected could individually or jointly provide protec-
tion for their vessels in the form of a naval escort 
to ensure safe and unimpeded navigation.
In the event that such a naval escort was met 
with armed interference (use of weapons, ram-
ming, attempted boarding) directed against either 
the escorting warship(s) or the vessels under its 
(their) protection, this could trigger proportionate 
and necessary measures of protection short of 
armed force, such as blocking counter manoeu-
vres or warnings, including warning shots where 
called for, and, in the event of a direct use of force, 
measures of self-defence aimed at warding off the 
unlawful armed interference.
What would constitute a necessary and pro-
portionate measure of protection or self-defence 
would depend on the nature of the interference 
and the factual circumstances.
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Scenario 7B. Ship Inspection Zone in 
front of countries Alpha and Beta
One month since establishing a control zone (Sce-
nario 7A), the controlling of SLOCs by Country 
Cronen continues. There is a clash between Coun-
try Cronen’s naval ships and coast guard vessels 
from two EU Member States (Country Alpha 
and Beta), the latter of which is also a member of 
NATO. The clash also involves warning shots and 
ramming. Country Cronen’s frigate and destroyer 
vessels intervene and apprehend one coast guard 
vessel from both Country Alpha and Country Beta, 
and it takes the two vessels to Country Cronen’s 
port. During the incident, the frigate uses missiles 
to shoot down one approaching military fighter jet 
plane from both Country Alpha and Country Beta. 
The two planes flew above the EEZs of the respec-
tive countries. The pilots were found dead.
The local media provides “strong” evidence of 
provocation from the West, where Country Cro-
nen’s coast guard vessels were intentionally dam-
aged and under serious threat of being targeted by 
the missiles of the jet planes. The frigate acted in 
self-defence. 
Based on increased tension, in two separate 
cases, i) and ii), Country Cronen declares measures 
against:
i) Country Alpha, in which hostile Western
support is allegedly being prepared. Country
Cronen reserves the right to stop and search,
and if necessary, prevent all shipping to
Country Alpha. In doing so, Country Cronen
de facto controls traffic to a substantial part of 
the coastline of Country Alpha.
ii) Country Beta, where NATO forces are
allegedly gathering for an offensive. Country
Cronen reserves the right to stop and search,
and if necessary, prevent all shipping to
Country Beta.
Has Country Cronen violated international law?
Legal scan of Scenario 7B. Ship Inspection 
Zone in front of countries Alpha and Beta
Based on this scenario, the attacks against ships 
and the ensuing seizure of Country Alpha and 
Country Beta coast guard vessels by Country 
Cronen constitute a direct use of force in violation 
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In addition, the 
attacks and seizure, depending on whether they 
took place in the EEZ or in the territorial sea, vio-
late the coastal states’ sovereignty in the territori-
al sea (Article 2(1) of UNCLOS), the prohibition of 
non-peaceful uses of the sea under Articles 88 and 
301 of UNCLOS, the freedom of navigation un-
der Articles 87(1) and 58(1) of UNCLOS, and the 
sovereign immunity of government vessels under 
Articles 32 and 96 of UNCLOS.
The shooting down of approaching military air-
craft during an incident in which Country Cronen 
is engaged in illegally apprehending coast guard 
vessels of Country Alpha and Country Beta is a 
violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter and cannot 
be plausibly defended as a legitimate measure of 
self-defence. Firstly, it cannot be defended be-
cause the apprehension of the coast guard vessels 
was in itself illegal and self-defence is the use of 
lawful force to counter a prior or imminent use of 
unlawful force. Secondly, it cannot be defended be-
cause there is no indication that the approaching 
aircraft constituted a direct threat of attack upon 
Country Cronen’s vessels. The shooting down of 
the two aircraft was consequently neither neces-
sary nor proportionate. The same applies to the 
measures implemented against Country Alpha and 
Country Beta following the shooting incident. The 
measures referred to have no basis in international 
law, as they do not constitute either lawful meas-
ures of self-defence against an armed attack, nor 
can they otherwise be justified as countermeas-
ures since no unlawful act has been committed and 
such measures do not conform to the criteria for 
the taking of countermeasures. Hence, they are 
illegal and, if they were actually carried out, would 
clearly constitute a violation of Article 2(4) of the 
Charter and, to the extent they were tantamount 
to a blockade, would additionally reach the thresh-
old of constituting an armed attack (see, e.g. Arti-
cle 3C of the Definition of Aggression annexed to 
UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX) 12 November 1974).
In the ensuing situations i) and ii), assuming 
that an international armed conflict ensues (which 
would not be the case with a mere declaration, 
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but rather due to naval clashes beforehand), the 
conduct of Country Cronen would need to be as-
sessed against the law of naval warfare. The rights 
of visit and search of merchant vessels are listed 
in the San Remo Manual in Section II, Articles 118 
to 124.
These provisions allow military ships and air-
craft to visit and search merchant vessels outside 
neutral waters if there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that they are subject to capture. As an al-
ternative to capture, a vessel may also be diverted 
from its destination.
A neutral merchant vessel is exempt from the 
right of search and visit if it is bound to a neutral 
port, is under a convoy accompanying a neutral 
warship, the neutral warship’s flag state warrants 
that the vessel is not carrying contraband or is oth-
erwise not engaged in activities that are not neu-
tral and if the commander of the neutral warship 
provides, if requested by the belligerent state, all 
information as to the nature of the merchant ves-
sel and its cargo as could otherwise be obtained by 
visit and search.
A belligerent warship or aircraft may divert a 
merchant vessel to an appropriate area or port 
to exercise search and visit if it is impossible or 
unsafe to conduct such activity at sea. Finally, as 
measures of supervision, belligerent states may 
establish reasonable measures for the inspection 
of the cargo of a merchant vessel as an alternative 
to visit and search, the compliance of which is not 
to be considered an act of a non-neutral nature 
with regard to an opposing belligerent.
In addition, neutral states are encouraged to 
enforce adequate control measures and certifica-
tion procedures to ensure that the merchant ves-
sel is not carrying contraband.7
Scenario 7C. Blockage of straits
In the event of Country Cronen’s International 
Armed Conflict (IAC) with Country Alpha (EU 
Member State) and with Country Beta (both an EU 
Member State and a member of NATO), the EU’s 
and also NATO’s reactions are considered. In addi-
tion, the legality of possible blockage of the straits 
against Country Cronen, which is also a littoral 
state, is evaluated.
Is there any room for manoeuvre below the 
threshold of war?
SCENARIO 7C. Blockage of straits
7 An arrest of a governmental vessel (a coast guard vessel qualifies) would be completely illegal, unless it was conducted in internal or territorial waters of 
the arresting state when the coast guard vessels were engaged in unauthorised entry into internal waters or activities prejudicial to the peace and good 
order of the arresting coastal state and persistently refused to comply with orders to leave. However, it would not in and of itself trigger an IAC, unless by 
armed force, beyond what was strictly necessary to conduct a lawful peacetime arrest against the vessel or crew.
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Legal scan of Scenario 7C. 
Blockage of straits
During peacetime, naval blockades (or other 
measures of control impeding free passage) are 
breaches of UNCLOS, as they interfere with the 
sovereignty and sovereign rights of coastal states 
and freedom of navigation on the high seas and in 
the EEZ, among other rules (see analysis of sce-
narios above), unless they are measures imposed 
by the UN Security Council to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. (Note that a blockade is 
not synonymous with an embargo ordered on the 
basis of a resolution of the UN Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.) A blockade 
is a measure imposed by a state that prevents 
free access to a coast or ports of the state against 
which it is directed. A blockade is considered to 
constitute a use of force, which would constitute 
a violation of the prohibition of force under Ar-
ticle 2(4) UN Charter, unless it had justification 
under the right of (collective) self-defence (see, 
e.g. the “Definition of Aggression”, UNGA RES. 
3314, Art. 3C). Whether or not it would qualify as
a lawful use of force in the context of (collective)
self-defence would depend on whether it met the
criteria for the exercise of (collective) self-defence
(a prior or imminent armed attack, a request by an
attacked state(s) for assistance, and necessity and
proportionality ad bellum).
A blockade that is simply rhetorical, i.e. not en-
forced, is an unfriendly act, but not a real blockade 
factually or legally, and hence, it would not qualify 
as a use of force nor would it violate UNCLOS or 
trigger an armed conflict so long as it was strictly 
verbal. However, a closure of international straits 
linking third state and others with the open sea 
constitutes a de facto blockade, regardless of what 
term is used to describe it. Since a blockade con-
stitutes a use of force, it would trigger an inter-
national armed conflict between the state(s) im-
posing it and the state it was directed against, and 
consequently, the applicability of the law of naval 
warfare. For a blockade to be lawful under this 
sub-regime of the law of armed conflict, it must 
meet a number of conditions (see Part IV, Section 
II, San Remo Manual). It must be duly notified and 
effectively and impartially enforced. Certain goods 
bound for an adversary are exempted from seizure 
if they meet the criteria of being strictly intended 
for humanitarian relief. Access to neutral ports by 
neutral vessels may not be denied. In a blockade, 
all vessels are, in principle, subject to belligerent 
visit and search. Neutral vessels may only be cap-
tured if they resist visit and search. In some cases, 
the visit and search of neutral vessels may be 
restricted or precluded if neutral vessels are trav-
eling under neutral convoy (see above under Sce-
nario 6). Belligerent merchant vessels are subject 
to capture and, if they perform certain acts, may 
be attacked as military objectives (e.g. providing 
intelligence to belligerent warships or aircraft). In 
summary, any blockade that in fact constitutes a 
“real” blockade through the act of being enforced 
is a blockade irrespective of what term is used to 
describe it and constitutes an “act of war”, which 
renders the blockading state(s) parties to an inter-
national armed conflict.
Assuming that Country Cronen is engaged in 
an international armed conflict with either Coun-
try Alpha or Country Beta, and the (other) MS, EU 
and NATO states have not (yet) entered the armed 
conflict, they cannot lawfully take any measures 
against Country Cronen in terms of blocking the 
straits used for international navigation. There-
fore, any kind of enforced blockade would be com-
pletely illegal. Once the states made the decision 
to exercise self-defence, their act would have to 
conform to the criteria for the lawful exercise of 
self-defence set out above for it to be legal under 
the UN Charter and the customary law relating to 
self-defence. It would additionally have to conform 
to the conditions for the imposition of a block-
ade under the law of naval warfare referred to 
above, irrespective of its legality as a measure of 
self-defence. It must be stressed that the question 
of applicability of international humanitarian law, 
including the law of naval warfare regulating block-
ade, is completely separate from whether an act is 
lawful under the law regulating the use of force. As 
stated above, once a blockade is imposed and en-
forced, it triggers an international armed conflict 
regardless of other considerations.
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Scenario 8. Exploitation of a contested 
continental shelf/EEZ
Country Upsilon and Country Delta have a 
long-standing historical dispute over their conti-
nental shelf/EEZ boundary, with a large maritime 
area being contested by these two countries.
Country Upsilon has moved an oil rig into the 
disputed maritime area and drilled for oil there, 
claiming that it is exercising its sovereign rights 
to exploit the natural resources of its continental 
shelf/EEZ. Country Delta has frequently, but un-
successfully, requested that Country Upsilon stop 
its drilling activities and negotiate a provisional 
boundary agreement.
Country Upsilon has declared a 3000-metre 
safety zone around the oil rig. Coast guard ships 
from Country Upsilon are patrolling in the vicinity 
of the oil rig and harassing any approaching coast 
guard ships and fishing vessels from Country  
Delta in the safety zone. This has led to some  
material damage of the vessels and economic 
losses due to reduced fishing activity and potential 
economic losses due to exploitation of the  
disputed resources.
→ Can Country Delta successfully claim that 
Country Upsilon has violated international law?
Legal scan of Scenario 8. Exploitation  
of a contested continental shelf/EEZ
Country Delta can pursue two separate legal ar-
guments against Country Upsilon based on (1) the 
latter’s oil drilling activity in the disputed area and 
(2) the interference with Country Delta’s coast 
guard ships and fishing vessels.
Concerning the oil drilling activity in an area 
of disputed EEZ and/or continental shelf, Country 
Delta can invoke Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS, 
respectively. These provisions, framed in identical 
terms, provide that the delimitation of the EEZ and 
continental shelf between states with coastlines on 
opposing or adjacent sides of a body of water shall 
be affected by agreement (Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
of UNCLOS). Pending such agreement, as is the 
case in this scenario, both states have an obliga-
tion to make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and an obliga-
tion not to hamper or jeopardise the reaching of a 
final agreement on the maritime boundary (Arti-
cles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS). The obligation 
“not to hamper or jeopardise” entails a prohibition 
against unilateral activities that might affect the 
other coastal state’s rights in the disputed area in a 
permanent manner – such as making physical  
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changes to the marine environment.8 Oil drilling 
is such an activity. Therefore, by drilling for oil in 
the disputed area, despite refusing to negotiate 
a provisional boundary arrangement in light of 
Country Delta’s attempts to initiate negotiations, 
Country Upsilon has violated both obligations in 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS.
Concerning the harassment of Country Delta’s 
coast guard ships and fishing vessels by Country 
Upsilon’s coast guard vessels in the vicinity of the 
oil rig, Country Delta may invoke its freedom of 
navigation in the EEZ, which applies also to dis-
putes in EEZ/continental shelf areas (Article 58(1) 
of UNCLOS) and its right to fish in the disputed 
area, pending delimitation of the maritime bound-
ary pursuant to Article 56(1)(a) of UNCLOS (to 
the extent that such fishing does not constitute a 
permanent physical change to the marine environ-
ment of the area).
The harassment of vessels not posing an imme-
diate danger violates these rights, as it is not jus-
tified as an enforcement and protection measure 
in the safety zone around the oil rig (Articles 60(4) 
and 80 of UNCLOS). Safety zones around arti-
ficial islands, installations and structures – such 
as oil rigs – in the EEZ/continental shelf may not 
exceed a limit of 500 m unless authorised by the 
applicable international standards or by the IMO 
(Articles 60(5) and 80 of UNCLOS).9 The safety 
zone established by Country Upsilon extends to 
3000 m, and therefore, it far exceeds the permis-
sible limits. It cannot be used to justify measures 
taken against foreign vessels, at least in its outer 
2500 m.
In addition, Country Upsilon’s coast guard 
ships, by harassing any approaching coast guard 
ships and fishing vessels from Country Delta, have 
likely violated obligations to take measures to 
prevent collisions at sea. Flag states are under an 
obligation to effectively exercise their jurisdiction 
and control over vessels flying their flag (Articles 
94(1) and 58(2) of UNCLOS). In particular, they 
shall take such measures as are necessary to en-
sure safety at sea with regard to the prevention of 
collisions (Articles 94(3)(c) and 58(2) of UNCLOS). 
In taking these measures, Country Upsilon is 
required to conform to generally accepted inter-
national regulations, procedures and practices 
and to take any steps that may be necessary to 
secure their observance (Articles 94(5) and 58(2) 
of UNCLOS). It has been accepted in international 
jurisprudence that these accepted international 
regulations include the Convention on the Interna-
tional Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGs).10 Here, Country Upsilon’s own coast 
guard ships, whose conduct is directly attributable 
to Country Upsilon, have intentionally harassed 
and possibly even rammed fishing vessels from 
Country Delta (although the latter is not entirely 
clear based on the facts of the case). Irrespective 
of whether material damage has resulted from de-
liberate collisions or as a result of recklessness, the 
actions are in violation of these regulations and 
Country Upsilon is ipso facto liable for any damage 
resulting from them, as the conduct of coast guard 
vessels is, as mentioned, directly attributable to 
the state.
Finally, based on the facts available, the harass-
ment activities by Country Upsilon’s coast guard 
ships do not amount to a use of force as prohibited 
by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, de-
pending on the extent and intensity of force used, 
the threshold for a violation of the use of force 
could hypothetically be crossed by conduct like 
that of Country Upsilon – particularly when direct-
ed at government vessels of the coastal state.
Scenario 9. Non-state actors
Country Omega and Country Kappa have had a 
long-term historical dispute over their EEZ bound-
ary. Recently, the disputed area has been allocated 
to Country Kappa via a decision taken by an inter-
national judicial body, which is binding upon both 
states.
8 PCA, Guyana v. Suriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 17 September 2007, paras. 465–470; ITLOS, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Judgment, 23 September 2017, paras. 624–634.
9 IMO, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO NAV, 56th Session, Agenda Item 20, IMO Doc. NAV 56/20, 31 August 2010. 
10 PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Award, 11 July 2016, paras. 1081–1109.
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There are concerns that Country Omega is uti-
lising politically motivated fishing vessels under 
its flag in the EEZ of Country Kappa. It has been 
suspected that these fishing vessels have harassed 
Country Kappa’s fishing vessels by disrupting 
them, blocking their navigation through dangerous 
navigational practices and intentional ramming. 
The fishing vessels of Country Omega are escort-
ed by a frigate from Country Omega’s navy. Coun-
try Kappa claims that these actions are motivated 
by Country Omega’s claim to traditional fishing 
rights in the area. No bilateral fisheries access 
agreement exists between the two states.
→ Can Country Kappa successfully claim that 
Country Omega has violated international law?
Legal scan of Scenario 9. Non-state actors
In this scenario, Country Omega appears to be us-
ing state-controlled “private actors”, namely fishing 
vessels, as a proxy to assert its claim to traditional 
fishing rights in the EEZ of Country Kappa. How-
ever, Country Omega also maintains a presence in 
Country Kappa’s EEZ with a warship that escorts 
its fishing vessels – likely to prevent enforcement 
actions by the coastal state against them.
As the coastal state, Country Kappa has sov-
ereign rights over the marine life resources of its 
EEZ (Article 56(1)(a) of UNCLOS), which includes 
prescriptive jurisdiction (Article 62(4) of UNCLOS) 
and enforcement jurisdiction (Article 73(1) of UN-
CLOS). In the EEZ, all states enjoy freedom of nav-
igation (Article 58(1) of UNCLOS). However, free-
dom of navigation does not include fishing in these 
waters without the consent of Country Kappa. 
So-called “traditional fishing rights” by third states 
in the EEZ have been held by international courts 
and tribunals to have been extinguished by the 
EEZ fisheries regime of UNCLOS, meaning that 
they cannot form a valid legal basis for the conduct 
of Country Omega’s fishing vessels.11 Therefore, 
Country Kappa can take enforcement measures 
against Country Omega’s fishing vessels in order 
to ensure compliance with its law and regulations.
Against this background, Country Omega has 
potentially violated international law in several 
ways:
Firstly, if the conduct of the fishing vessels 
can be attributed to Country Omega because 
the seemingly “private” fishing vessels are in fact 
acting under its control and following its orders, 
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11 PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Award, 11 July 2016, paras. 239–262.
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then Country Omega would have violated Country 
Kappa’s sovereign rights over fisheries in the EEZ 
(Article 56(1)(a) of UNCLOS).
Secondly, failing such attribution, Coun-
try Omega has evidently failed to take the neces-
sary measures to prevent the fishing vessels under 
its flag from fishing illegally in the EEZ of Country 
Kappa. The presence of its frigate as an escort to 
its fishing vessels is clear proof of Country Ome-
ga’s knowledge of the illegal conduct by its fishing 
vessels and its ability to intervene. Article 58(3) 
of UNCLOS imposes a due regard obligation on 
all third states to respect the laws and regulations 
of the coastal state, which has been interpreted 
(sometimes in conjunction with Article 62(4) of 
UNCLOS) by both the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea and an UNCLOS Annex VII ar-
bitral tribunal as an obligation to ensure that fish-
ing vessels under their flag do not fish illegally in 
the EEZs of other states. The omission by Country 
Omega of any measures to prevent illegal fishing 
by its fishing vessels constitutes a violation of its 
corresponding due diligence obligation under Arti-
cle 58(3) of UNCLOS.12
Thirdly, any interference with Country Kappa’s 
enforcement measures taken against the fishing 
vessels of Country Omega by that state’s warship 
would constitute a violation of Country Kappa’s 
sovereign rights over fisheries in the EEZ (Arti-
cle 56(1)(a) of UNCLOS).
Fourthly, as the flag state of the fishing ves-
sels, Country Omega is under an obligation to 
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control 
over them (Articles 94(1) and 58(2) of UNCLOS). 
In particular, it shall take such measures for ships 
flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety 
at sea with regard to the prevention of collisions 
(Articles 94(3)(c) and 58(2) of UNCLOS). In taking 
these measures, Country Omega is required to 
conform to generally accepted international regu-
lations, procedures and practices and to take any 
steps that may be necessary to secure their obser-
vance (Articles 94(5) and 58(2) of UNCLOS). It has 
been accepted in international jurisprudence that 
these accepted international regulations include 
the Convention on the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs).13 By 
failing to take measures to prevent its fishing ves-
sels from ramming Country Kappa’s fishing vessels, 
Country Omega has violated its due diligence ob-
ligation to ensure that its vessels respect interna-
tional standards for the prevention of collisions.
Scenario 10A. Detention of a vessel by  
a coastal state based on an alleged terrorist 
attack
Political tension between Country Gamma and 
Country Iota is growing. A passenger cruise ship, 
sailing under the flag of Country Gamma and 
owned by Company X in Country Omicron, with 
over 2,000 passengers from several nations, re-
ceives warning of a terrorist attack on board. The 
crew of 500 persons also represents several dif-
ferent nations.
The cruise ship is currently in passage through 
the territorial sea of Country Iota to its destina-
tion, a popular tourist port in Country Gamma. 
The threat is issued by a small group of individuals, 
under instructions from Country Iota, who are 
threatening to blow up the cruise ship unless their 
demands are met.
Country Iota‘s law enforcement authorities 
rapidly launch a counter operation to allegedly 
eliminate the severe threat. The ship is boarded 
and detained by Country Iota for further inspec-
tions and action until further notice. No passenger 
or crew casualties nor material damage were re-
ported, while Country Iota claims to have neutral-
ised the alleged threat.
At the time of the unilateral actions taken by 
Country Iota, the cruise ship is located i) in the 
territorial sea of Country Iota or ii) in the EEZ of 
Country Iota.
→ Can Country Gamma successfully claim that 
Country Iota has violated international law?
12 PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Award, 11 July 2016, paras. 735–757.
13 PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Award, 11 July 2016, paras. 1081–1109.
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Legal scan of Scenario 10A. Detention  
of a vessel by a coastal state based on  
an alleged terrorist attack
In this scenario, the coastal state (Country Iota) 
apparently stages a terrorist threat against a 
cruise ship sailing under the flag of its political 
opponent, Country Gamma, in order to intercept 
and detain the ship and damage Country Gamma’s 
tourist industry.
From an international legal perspective, it 
might be difficult to attribute the terrorist threat 
to Country Iota due to a lack of evidence. This is 
the main challenge for an assessment of the legal-
ity of the conduct of Country Iota. For this reason, 
it is useful to first analyse the situation by assum-
ing that there was a real terrorist threat without 
any role on the part of Country Iota. Subsequently, 
the situation will be analysed on the basis of the 
assumption that sufficient evidence exists to at-
tribute the terrorist incident to Country Iota.
Situation i): Territorial Sea of Country Iota
The coastal state has sovereignty in its territorial 
sea (Article 2(1) of UNCLOS), which also involves 
criminal jurisdiction (cf. Article 27 of UNCLOS). 
However, all states have a right of innocent pas-
sage through the territorial sea (Article 17 of 
UNCLOS), and coastal states are prohibited from 
hampering the innocent passage of foreign vessels 
(Article 24(1) of UNCLOS) except where they are 
expressly permitted to do so by UNCLOS or where 
the flag state has given its consent (Article 27(1)(c) 
of UNCLOS).
There is a general presumption that passage by 
foreign vessels is an innocent act (Article 19(1) of 
UNCLOS), but passage may be non-innocent if it is 
“prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal State” (Article 19(1) of UNCLOS). Ar-
ticle 19(2) of UNCLOS contains a non-exhaustive 
list of activities that are non-innocent. Terrorist 
activity is not explicitly included within one of the 
listed examples. However, terrorist activity can 
nonetheless be considered non-innocent either 
on the basis of the “backup” category in Article 
19(2)(l) of UNCLOS or directly on the basis of Ar-
ticle 19(1) of UNCLOS, as it is “prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State”. 
Here, it should be noted that UN Security Council 
resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), adopt-
ed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, indicate 
that terrorist attacks may be considered to pose a 
threat to international peace and security.
In this case, the coastal state may take “the 
necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent 
passage which is not innocent” (Article 25(1) of 
UNCLOS). Depending on the circumstances, the 
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boarding of a vessel may be a “necessary step” to 
prevent its non-innocent passage.
In any case, the coastal state may exercise crim-
inal jurisdiction on board a foreign ship in passage 
“to arrest any person or to conduct any investiga-
tion in connection with any crime committed on 
board the ship during its passage”, at least “if the 
consequences of the crime extend to the coastal 
State” or “if the crime is of a kind to disturb the 
peace of the country or the good order of the ter-
ritorial sea” (Article 27(1)(a) and (b) of UNCLOS). 
In the case of terrorist activity, both these require-
ments may be fulfilled and the coastal state (in this 
scenario Country Iota) may lawfully board the af-
fected vessel in order to neutralise the threat and 
exercise criminal jurisdiction.
However, the coastal state may only detain 
the vessel and crew for as long as it is necessary 
to neutralise the threat, make arrests/collect evi-
dence and conclude its investigations.
To conclude: if there had been a real terrorist 
threat, Country Iota may have lawfully exercised 
jurisdiction over the cruise ship, but the legality 
of the ongoing detention depends on the circum-
stances of the case.
If, on the other hand, it is assumed that Coun-
try Iota has staged the terrorist threat, and if there 
is sufficient evidence to attribute the orchestrated 
threat to Country Iota, then Country Iota has 
clearly violated international law. The boarding and 
detention of the cruise ship would violate the right 
of innocent passage of Country Gamma (Article 17 
of UNCLOS) and its obligation to not hamper inno-
cent passage (Article 24(1) of UNCLOS). Given the 
malicious intent of Country Iota, as evidenced by 
the staging of the terrorist threat (assuming that 
sufficient evidence exists), these violations likely 
amount to bad faith and thus also involve a breach 
of Article 300 of UNCLOS.
Potentially, and depending on the human rights 
obligations of Country Iota arising from the human 
rights instruments it is a party to, Country Iota 
would likely also violate the rights of the individu-
als on board the vessel (both passengers and crew) 
to not be subjected to illegal detention or restric-
tion of liberty.
Situation ii): EEZ of Country Iota
If the interception and detention of the cruise ship 
takes place in the EEZ of Country Iota, and if it is 
assumed that the terrorist threat was real and not 
attributable to Country Iota, then the state’s con-
duct nonetheless constitutes a prima facie violation 
of international law, which might be justified under 
exceptional circumstances.
As the flag state of the cruise ship, Country 
Gamma enjoys freedom of navigation in the EEZ of 
Country Iota (Article 58(1) of UNCLOS) and exclu-
sive enforcement jurisdiction (Articles 92(1) and 
58(2) of UNCLOS). The issue of terrorist activity 
is not covered by coastal state jurisdiction (e.g. 
Article 56(1) of UNCLOS) and does not fall within 
an exception to exclusive flag state enforcement 
jurisdiction (e.g. Articles 110 and 58(2) of UN-
CLOS). Therefore, boarding and arrest are subject 
to the consent of the flag state (Country Gamma). 
However, no consent was obtained in the present 
scenario.
So even if the terrorist threat was real, Country 
Iota’s interception and detention of the cruise ship 
constitutes a prima facie violation of Article 58(1) 
of UNCLOS and Articles 92(1) and 58(2) of UN-
CLOS. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there could 
be circumstances in which a boarding of the ves-
sel might exceptionally be justified. In a situation 
where a clear threat to the safety of the vessel and 
the lives and safety of its passengers and crew ap-
peared to be imminent and grave based on reliable 
information available at the time, a non-consensual 
boarding could potentially be justified under the 
rubric “state of necessity” under the law of state 
responsibility if it was the only means available to 
prevent the threat of detonating the vessel, endan-
gering the lives of more than 2000 persons, and 
there was no realistic prospect of receiving timely 
consent from the flag state.
However, if the terrorist threat were staged 
by Country Iota and was attributable to that 
state based on the available evidence, then the 
staging of the terrorist threat itself might amount 
to a violation of the freedom of navigation of 
Country Gamma (Article 58(1) of UNCLOS). In 
any case, the interception and detention of the 
cruise ship would constitute a violation of Country 
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Gamma’s freedom of navigation (Article 58(1) of 
UNCLOS) and its exclusive flag state jurisdiction 
(Articles 92(1) and 58(2) of UNCLOS). Given the 
malicious intent of Country Iota, as evidenced by 
the staging of the terrorist threat (if sufficient ev-
idence is available), these violations likely amount 
to bad faith and thus also involve a breach of Arti-
cle 300 of UNCLOS.
If the staging of the terrorist threat involves 
armed force, it could also constitute a violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, the facts 
provided in the present scenario do not unequiv-
ocally point to such a conclusion. However, the 
persons responsible for a staged terrorist threat 
and ensuing seizure of the vessel and the persons 
on board in the context of a bogus criminal inves-
tigation may be subject to criminal prosecution 
under the laws of Country Gamma or those of the 
states whose nationals were subjected to intimida-
tion and unlawful detention by agents of Country 
Iota or persons acting under its instructions. The 
owners of the vessel would be entitled to compen-
sation for its unlawful seizure and detention under 
private law.
The assessment would be the same if the in-
terception and detention had been conducted 
on the high seas, as the applicable legal rules are 
essentially the same (Articles 87(1)(a) and 90 of 
UNCLOS for the freedom of navigation and Arti-
cle 92(1) of UNCLOS for exclusive flag state juris-
diction).
Potentially, and depending on the human rights 
obligations of Country Iota arising from the human 
rights instruments it is a party to, Country Iota’s 
conduct would certainly constitute a serious viola-
tion of the rights of the individuals on board to not 
be subjected to threats of physical and psycholog-
ical violence.
Scenario 10B. Detention of a vessel by a 
third country based on an alleged terrorist 
attack
Political tension between Country Gamma and 
Country Iota is growing. A passenger cruise ship, 
sailing under the flag of Country Gamma and 
owned by Company X in Country Omicron, with 
over 2,000 passengers from several nations, many 
of whom are from Country Iota, receives warning 
of a terror attack on board. The crew of 500 per-
sons also represents several different nations.
The cruise ship is currently in passage close to 
Country Epsilon’s waters, on its way to a popular 
tourist port in Country Gamma. The threat is is-
sued by small group of individuals, who are threat-
ening to cause an explosion on board the cruise 
ship unless their demands are met.
After receiving a distress call from the cruise 
ship, law enforcement authorities from Country 
Gamma and Country Epsilon are preparing to 
launch a counterterrorism operation to eliminate 
the severe threat. However, Country Iota unilater-
ally executes a counterterrorism operation in or-
der to protect its citizens before the operation by 
Country Gamma and Country Epsilon has begun.
In the execution of its counterterrorism opera-
tion, Country Iota uses special forces to board the 
cruise ship and escorts it to a port in Country Iota 
for further investigation. No passenger or crew 
casualties nor material damage were reported, 
while Country Iota claims to have neutralised the 
alleged threat.
At the time of the unilateral actions taken by 
Country Iota, the cruise ship was located i) in the 
territorial sea of Country Epsilon or ii) in the EEZ 
of Country Epsilon.
→ Can Country Gamma and/or Country Epsi-
lon successfully claim that Country Iota has violat-
ed international law?
Legal Scan of Scenario 10B:
In this scenario, a third state (Country Iota) that 
is neither the flag state nor the coastal state in-
tercepts and detains a cruise ship sailing under 
the flag of its political opponent, Country Gamma, 
under the veil of an antiterrorism/rescue opera-
tion in order to damage Country Gamma’s tourist 
industry. Both the flag state (Country Gamma) and 
the coastal state (Country Epsilon) might claim 
violations of international law.
Situation i): Territorial Sea of Country Epsilon
The coastal state (Country Epsilon) has sovereign-
ty in its territorial sea (Article 2(1) of UNCLOS), 
which extends to combatting criminal activity that 
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affects its security and the good order of the ter-
ritorial sea (Articles 25(1) and 27(1) of UNCLOS). 
There is no room for similar enforcement action 
by other states. Therefore, by intercepting and 
detaining the cruise ship in the territorial sea of 
Country Epsilon, Country Iota violated the sov-
ereignty of Country Epsilon (Article 2(1) of UN-
CLOS).
In addition, all states have a right to innocent 
passage through the territorial sea (Article 17 of 
UNCLOS), which provides for unimpeded passage 
through the territorial sea of a coastal state (sub-
ject to some exceptions set out earlier). However, 
in this case it is not the coastal state (Country Ep-
silon) that intercepts and detains the cruise ship, 
but a third state (Country Iota). Third states have 
no jurisdiction whatsoever in the territorial sea of 
a coastal state and must respect the right of the 
flag state vis-à-vis vessels sailing under its flag. 
Hence, any act of law enforcement would be sub-
ject to the consent of the coastal state and would 
have to respect the flag state’s rights.
However, Country Iota has not obtained the 
consent of Country Gamma to intercept and 
detain the cruise ship. Furthermore, none of the 
exceptions from exclusive flag state jurisdiction 
on the high seas apply in the territorial sea (e.g. 
Article 110 of UNCLOS). In addition, the duty to 
render assistance to ships in distress (Article 98 of 
UNCLOS),14 which might also apply in the territo-
rial sea, does not constitute an exception to exclu-
sive flag state jurisdiction that can be used for the 
interception of foreign vessels.
In the absence of a legal basis for its conduct 
in UNCLOS, Country Iota could try to argue that 
it has a right under customary international law to 
rescue and evacuate its nationals from the cruise 
ship in light of the severe danger to their lives and 
safety. However, no such right is clearly estab-
lished. Even if one accepts that such a right may 
allow for rescue operations in certain circumstanc-
es, it is unlikely that the criteria for forcible pro-
tection/evacuation of nationals in this case have 
been met, as it appears that no attempt was made 
to coordinate the operation with the coastal state 
and there is no reason to assume that the coastal 
state was not capable of addressing the threat. Al-
ternatively, Country Iota could recognise the initial 
illegality of its operation but make a similar argu-
ment based on the defence of necessity under the 
law of state responsibility. However, it is unlikely 
that such a plea would be successful in this case 
for the reasons relating to the other putative justi-
fication, particularly in the absence of any attempt 
to coordinate their actions with the authorities of 
Country Gamma and Country Epsilon. At any rate, 
a right to rescue its nationals from the ship would 
not have entailed a right for Country Iota to detain 
the ship and escort it to one of its ports.
Against this background, the interception and 
detention of the cruise ship by Country Iota con-
stitutes a violation of the flag state rights of Coun-
try Gamma.
Situation ii): EEZ of Country Epsilon
If the interception and detention of the cruise ship 
sailing under the flag of Country Gamma by Coun-
try Iota takes place in the EEZ of Country Epsilon, 
the legal situation differs slightly. The reason is 
that no coastal state rights of Country Epsilon are 
at issue if the events take place in its EEZ, where it 
does not have sovereignty and where the high seas 
regime of navigation applies largely mutatis mutan-
dis (Articles 58(1), (2) of UNCLOS).
However, with respect to the rights of the flag 
state in an EEZ (Country Gamma), the situation is 
one whereby the flag state enjoys freedom of navi-
gation (Article 58(1) of UNCLOS) and exclusive ju-
risdiction over its vessels (Articles 92(1) and 58(2) 
of UNCLOS) vis-á-vis third states, except for mat-
ters regulated under Articles 110, 111 or 105 of 
UNCLOS (each in conjunction with Article 58(2) of 
UNCLOS). Neither of these conditions is relevant 
here. In the circumstances of the present scenario 
especially, it is not tenable to maintain that piracy 
is at issue because the events are taking place  
 
14 The duty to rescue is further clarified in a number of treaties, including the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention).
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on the same ship, without an attack on another 
ship, and are not undertaken for private ends (cf. 
Articles 101 and 105 of UNCLOS). While some 
commentators have argued that maritime terror-
ism should be considered tantamount to piracy, 
the prevailing position of both experts and states 
is that it is a separate category of unlawful acts 
against the safety of navigation, which is regulated 
by a separate convention.15 Even if this were the 
case, the view that maritime terrorism constitutes 
piracy is generally rejected, although a minority 
opinion supports such an interpretation. Finally, 
the obligation to render assistance in cases of dis-
tress (Article 98 of UNCLOS) does not constitute 
an exception to exclusive flag state jurisdiction that 
could be used as a legal basis for the interception 
and detention of a foreign vessel.
In the absence of a legal basis for its conduct 
in UNCLOS, Country Iota could try to argue that 
it has a right under customary international law to 
rescue and evacuate its nationals from the cruise 
ship in light of the severe danger to their safety 
and life. However, as shown with respect to Situa-
tion i) above, such an argument would not be suc-
cessful. In any case, a right to rescue its nationals 
from the ship would not have entailed a right for 
Country Iota to detain the ship and escort it to one 
of its ports.
Against this background, the interception and 
detention of the cruise ship by Country Iota con-
stitutes a violation of Country Gamma’s freedom 
of navigation (Article 58(1) of UNCLOS) and its 
exclusive flag state jurisdiction in the EEZ (Arti-
cles 92(1) and 58(2) of UNCLOS).
The assessment would be the same if the in-
terception and detention had been conducted 
on the high seas, as the applicable legal rules are 
essentially the same (Articles 87(1)(a) and 90 of 
UNCLOS for the freedom of navigation and Arti-
cle 92(1) of UNCLOS for exclusive flag state juris-
diction).
15 For the majority view, see R. Churchill, “The piracy provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Fit for purpose?”, in The Law and Practice 
of Piracy at Sea: European and International Perspectives, eds. P. Koutrakos and A. Skordas (Oxford: Hard Publishing, 2014), p. 9.
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Where it has been established that a state has 
violated another state’s rights under public inter-
national law, and specifically the international law 
of the sea, various responses may be considered. 
These may be operational, political or legal options. 
This Annex specifically addresses legal responses 
available to states willing to hold other states ac-
countable for violations of their rights.
Reactive measures: diplomatic summons, 
sanctions, countermeasures and self-defence
There exists a variety of “reactive” measures that 
a state can take in reaction to violations of public 
international law. Diplomatic responses such as 
consultations or negotiations are usually the least 
escalating measures. The severity of the issue and 
the extent of disapproval can also be highlighted, 
for example by a public summons of high-level 
diplomats from another state. Additionally, states 
may have recourse to self-help measures, such 
as economic sanctions (including sanctions by a 
political block such as the EU) and the withholding 
of certain benefits in order to induce the perpe-
trator to comply with its international obligations. 
In some cases, self-help measures (retorsion) may 
include physical acts not involving the use of force, 
such as providing protection at sea to vessels of 
the protecting state’s nationality against threats of 
unlawful interference and engaging in “freedom of 
navigation” exercises to affirm a right that is being 
challenged. It is important to bear in mind that 
while such self-help measures do not in themselves 
violate international law, they must be carried out 
in a way that strictly conforms to international law 
and does not pose a threat to international peace 
and security.
Where appropriate, the injured state(s) may 
also choose to adopt countermeasures against the 
perpetrator under the law of state responsibility  
(see, in particular, the Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001 
drafted by the International Law Commission).16 
Countermeasures are subject to a number of con-
ditions, which must be met in order for them to be 
lawful. These include a prior demand for redress 
whenever feasible, proportionality of the meas-
ures to the harm inflicted, no measures violating 
fundamental human rights and no use or threat of 
armed force (as prohibited by Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter), to name the most important.
However, where a state is subject to an illegal 
use of force by another state that amounts to an 
“armed attack”, it may use force in self-defence 
(Article 51(1) of the UN Charter). Additionally, the 
injured state may consider seeking assistance from 
the UN Security Council (Articles 39 ff. of the UN 
Charter) or under another multilateral system, 
such as NATO. Whatever measures are taken, ide-
ally parallel diplomatic efforts should continue.
Proactive means of peaceful dispute settlement: 
diplomatic means and binding third-party dispute
settlement procedures
As a basic principle of the international legal order, 
disputes must be resolved peacefully (Article 2(3) 
of the UN Charter). “Proactive” means of peaceful 
dispute settlement listed in Article 33(1) of the UN 
Charter include:
• Negotiation
• Enquiry
• Mediation
• Conciliation
• Arbitration
• Judicial settlement
• Resort to regional agencies or arrangements
• Other peaceful means of their own choice
4. LEGAL RESPONSES TO MARITIME
HYBRID SCENARIOS
16 http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf.
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Diplomatic means, in particular negotiation, pro-
vide the greatest degree of control and flexibility 
by the disputing states. They are also the least 
intrusive with respect to the sovereignty of the 
disputing states. For this reason, negotiation is 
usually the first step in international dispute set-
tlement – and also most often the final one. Proce-
dures such as enquiry, mediation and conciliation 
involve a third party that supports the negotiation 
process without, however, rendering any binding 
decisions. The ultimate decision remains with the 
disputing states.
In addition to diplomatic means, the injured 
state may seek to take the dispute to binding 
third-party dispute settlement (arbitration or ju-
dicial settlement) before an international court or 
tribunal. Such litigation is supplementary to other 
measures and is usually considered when diplo-
matic means do not resolve the dispute in a timely 
fashion. In such cases, the relationship between 
the two disputing states is usually such that this 
step is warranted and does not undermine, for 
example, fruitful ongoing diplomatic talks.
Perhaps the most important aspect of litigation 
before international courts and tribunals is the 
question of jurisdiction, meaning the question of 
whether a court or tribunal is competent to decide 
on a given dispute. As there is no court or tribunal 
of general jurisdiction in public international law, 
and because states must have given consent to 
jurisdiction over their disputes, in many cases no 
legal avenue is available that can be pursued for 
the purposes of litigation. The situation is relative-
ly positive with respect to the international law of 
the sea – at least with respect to disputes concern-
ing the interpretation and application of UNCLOS.
For present purposes, the most important ave-
nues of inter-state litigation concerning maritime 
disputes are the International Court of Justice and 
the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism of 
Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS. Litigation before 
the International Court of Justice has been ex-
cluded from the scope of this analysis as it entails 
an ad hoc analysis of declarations by the disputing 
states under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Therefore, the pres-
ent analysis is confined to the dispute settlement 
mechanism of UNCLOS as it applies to all States 
Parties to UNCLOS (note that various important 
states are not parties to UNCLOS).
Litigation under Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS
The obligation to settle disputes peacefully is also 
enshrined in UNCLOS (Articles 279 and 301 of 
UNCLOS). Various optional means are listed in 
Section 1 of Part XV (Articles 280–282 and 284 of 
UNCLOS). In addition, States Parties have an obli-
gation to proceed expeditiously to an exchange of 
views regarding the settlement of the dispute by 
negotiation or other peaceful means (Article 283 
of UNCLOS). Only where recourse to Section 1 of 
Part XV (including an exchange of views) has not 
led to a resolution of the dispute can States Parties 
turn to binding dispute settlement under Section 2 
(Article 286 of UNCLOS).
Choice of forum
State Parties can at any time (but prior to the initi-
ation of proceedings in a given dispute) select one 
or more of four fora for the settlement of their dis-
pute under UNCLOS (Article 287(1) of UNCLOS):
•	 the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
 Sea (ITLOS)
•	 the International Court of Justice
•	 an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
 with Annex VII of UNCLOS
•	 a special arbitral tribunal constituted in  
 accordance with Annex VIII of UNCLOS for  
 one or more of the categories of disputes  
 specified therein (fisheries, protection and  
 preservation of the marine environment,  
 marine scientific research or navigation,  
 including pollution from vessels and by  
 dumping)
If the two disputing states have selected the same 
forum for their dispute, the selected forum will be 
competent to hear the dispute (Article 287(4) of 
UNCLOS). If that is not the case, or if no selection 
has been made at all, an arbitral tribunal under 
Annex VII of UNCLOS will be deemed competent 
to hear the dispute by default (Article 287(3)-(5) 
of UNCLOS). In practice, this means that most 
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17 ITLOS, Case concerning the detention of three Ukrainian naval vessels (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, 25 May 2019, 
paras. 33–77.
disputes are decided by an arbitral tribunal under 
Annex VII of UNCLOS. For certain specific catego-
ries of disputes, which are not of particular inter-
est for present purposes, the ITLOS has exclusive 
jurisdiction. Importantly, however, the ITLOS is 
competent to grant provisional measures pending 
the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under An-
nex VII or Annex VIII of UNCLOS (Article 290(5) 
of UNCLOS). This procedure is frequently used.
Subject-matter jurisdiction
The extent of subject-matter jurisdiction of  
fora under Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS is  
a key issue in most cases. If no subject-matter  
jurisdiction exists, the case will not proceed to  
the merits, even if there has been a violation of  
international law.
Step 1: In principle, subject-matter jurisdiction is 
limited to “any dispute concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of [UNCLOS]” (Article 288(1) 
of UNCLOS). This means that disputes concerning 
other treaties or customary international law (such 
as the law of naval warfare) in principle fall outside 
the scope of Article 288(1) of UNCLOS. However, 
disputes concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of other treaties may in exceptional cases be 
decided under Section 2 of Part XV if the relevant 
treaty so provides (Article 288(2) of UNCLOS).
Step 2: Even where Article 288(1) of UNCLOS 
provides for subject-matter jurisdiction, this sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction is automatically limited by 
Article 297 of UNCLOS. The limitations concern 
issues potentially relevant in the present context, 
namely coastal state measures concerning ma-
rine scientific research activities of third states in 
the EEZ/continental shelf (Article 297(2) of UN-
CLOS) and coastal state fisheries measures (Arti-
cle 297(3) of UNCLOS).
Step 3: Finally, even where a dispute falls within 
Article 288(1) of UNCLOS and is not subject to 
one of the limitations in Article 297 of UNCLOS, 
it may still be excluded from the scope of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction if a state has excluded 
it by lodging a declaration on the basis of Arti-
cle 298(1) of UNCLOS. The types of disputes that 
can be excluded are maritime delimitation disputes 
and disputes concerning historic bays or titles 
(Article 298(1)(a) of UNCLOS), disputes concern-
ing military activities, including military activities 
by government vessels and aircraft engaged in 
non-commercial service, as well as disputes con-
cerning law enforcement activities in regard to the 
exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction exclud-
ed from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal un-
der Article 297(2)-(3) of UNCLOS (Article 298(1)
(b) of UNCLOS). In addition, states can exclude dis-
putes in respect to which the UN Security Council 
is exercising the functions assigned to it by the UN 
Charter (Article 298(1)(c) of UNCLOS).
Given the importance of the question of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, it is of utmost impor-
tance to streamline legal narratives released 
publicly and vis-á-vis the other perpetrating state 
in accordance with the narratives to be pursued 
in a potential litigation phase of the dispute. This 
is especially the case where hybrid maritime op-
erations are concerned, as such operations often 
exploit legal grey zones and ambiguities – includ-
ing the not always clearly defined line between 
maritime law enforcement operations and military 
operations. For example, where a coastal state 
conducts a hybrid military operation under the 
veil of a maritime law enforcement narrative, this 
might backfire when the same state tries to rely on 
its declaration under Article 298(1)(b) of UNCLOS 
to argue that an international court or tribunal es-
tablished pursuant to Section 2 of Part XV of UN-
CLOS lacks jurisdiction over “military activities”.17 
Conversely, the injured state in such an operation 
might have to contradict itself if it chooses to clas-
sify a hybrid maritime operation by its opponent 
as a military activity, a use of force (Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter) or a measure in an armed conflict 
subject to international humanitarian law.
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The purpose of the previous chapters was to illus-
trate how public international law, and specifically 
the international law of the sea, can be harnessed 
as a tool for detrimental security measures at sea. 
By juxtaposing the rights contained in the inter-
national maritime law, the malicious hybrid actor 
has the opportunity to create a confusing and chal-
lenging situation, in which the target may have the 
utmost difficulty, and the larger international com-
munity as well, in forming an accurate situational 
awareness and making the necessary decisions 
on proper counter responses in a timely fashion. 
During the past few years, the world has already 
witnessed several such activities, highlighting how 
preparedness at all levels needs to be improved to 
meet, counter and recover from such situations.
At worst, malicious security measures at sea 
may lead to significant damage. A minor but deadly 
military measure, provoked or not, may trigger 
International Armed Conflict to enter into force, 
which would allow one state to apply such meas-
ures as confiscations, controls and even blockades. 
In a hybrid conflict, these kinds of measures would 
enable one state to put a stranglehold on the ship-
ping to and from another state. Particularly, if a 
third party implements IHL/Naval warfare against 
an EU/NATO member leading to International 
Armed Conflict, this will put NATO Collective  
defence Article 5 and the mutual defence clause 
Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union 
under a tough, concrete test.  
When a hybrid conflict emerges at sea, it is 
recommended that mitigation and proactive multi-
national measures be launched at the earliest pos-
sible convenience. This may prevent controversial 
situations from escalating into serious conflict, or 
worse. There should be low tolerance for infringe-
ments and a low threshold for initiating consulta-
tions with EU/NATO/United Nations. A unified, 
multinational response and/or presence at an early 
stage is likely to lower the risk of facing more seri-
ous impacts. Here, attribution (technical and polit-
ical) plays a key role in defining countermeasures 
and as a tool of deterrence.
The search for solutions at a multilateral level 
and common ways to better identify vulnerabilities 
in the maritime domain should continue in order 
to make such vulnerabilities fewer and weaker and 
to increase the overall resilience of the operational 
environment. For its part, this Handbook is intend-
ed to contribute to this work.
5. CONCLUSIONS
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TABLE: Jurisdiction under Article 288 of UNCLOS concerning Scenarios 1–11B
Scenario
1
2
3
4
5(i)
5(iv)
5(ii)
5(iii)
5(v)
Rights and obligations violated
(depending on factual circumstances)
–
Depending on location:
Article 2(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 87(1)(a) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Depending on facts:
Article 2(4) UN Charter
Article 2(4) UN Charter
Articles 88, 301 and 58(2) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Depending on location:
Article 2(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 87(2) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(3) UNCLOS (coastal state)
sovereignty of the territorial state
(Article 2(4) UN Charter)
Depending on location:
Article 2(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Articles 56(1) and 77(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
After international armed conflict ensues:
Mainly potential breaches of law of naval 
warfare, not of UNCLOS
See Scenario 5(i).
See Scenario 5(i).
See Scenario 5(iv).
Jurisdiction
(Article 288(1))
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Exclusion of Jurisdiction
(Articles 297, 298)
–
Classification of measures  
as “military activities” under 
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS may 
be attempted (success unclear).
(Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS)
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Classification of measures as 
“military activities” under  
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS may 
be attempted (success unclear).
(Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS)
6A) Article 2(4) UN Charter
Depending on location:
Article 2(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(3) UNCLOS (coastal state)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS)
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
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6B
7B
7C
8
9
10A(i)
10A(ii)
10B(i)
10B(ii)
7A
Article 2(4) UN Charter
Depending on location:
Article 2(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(3) UNCLOS (coastal state)
After international armed conflict ensues:
Potential breaches of law of naval
warfare, not of UNCLOS
If blockade is imposed without justification:
Navigational rights under UNCLOS
Article 2(4) UN Charter
Measures once blockade is established:
Potential breaches of law of naval warfare,  
not of UNCLOS
Article 74(3) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 83(3) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 56(1)(a) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Articles 94 and 58(2) UNCLOS in conjunction 
with COLREGs (flag state)
Article 56(1)(a) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 58(3) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Articles 94 and 58(2) UNCLOS in conjunction 
with COLREGs (flag state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 24(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Articles 92(1) and 58(2) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 2(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Articles 92(1) and 58(2) UNCLOS (flag state)
Depending on location:
Article 2(1) UNCLOS (coastal state)
Article 17 UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(1) UNCLOS (flag state)
Article 58(3) UNCLOS (coastal state)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS)
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
(Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS)
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS
(Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS)
(Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS)
Article 298(1)(a) UNCLOS
Article 298(1)(a) UNCLOS
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Classification of measures  
as “military activities” under 
Article 298(1)(b) UNCLOS may 
be attempted (success unclear).
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LIST: STATES THAT ARE NOT STATES PARTIES TO UNCLOS
•	 Afghanistan
•	 Andorra
•	 Bhutan
•	 Burundi
•	 Cambodia
•	 Central African Republic
•	 Colombia
•	 El Salvador
•	 Eritrea
•	 Ethiopia
•	 Iran
•	 Israel
•	 Kazakhstan
•	 Kyrgyzstan
•	 Libya
•	 Liechtenstein
•	 North Korea
•	 Peru
•	 Rwanda
•	 San Marino
•	 South Sudan
•	 Syria
•	 Tajikistan
•	 Turkey
•	 Turkmenistan
•	 United Arab Emirates
•	 United States
•	 Uzbekistan
•	 Vatican City State/Holy See
•	 Venezuela
TABLE: States that have lodged declarations under Article 298(1) of UNCLOS
State
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Belarus
Canada
Cabo Verde
Chile
China
Cuba
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
Equatorial 
Guinea
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo
Military activities  
(lit. b)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Law enforcement  
activities in the EEZ 
(lit. b)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
UN Security Council 
exercising its functions 
(lit. c)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Delimitation and  
historic bays or titles 
(lit. a)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
(X)
State
France
Gabon
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Kenya
Malaysia
Montenegro
Palau
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Nicaragua
Slovenia
Norway
Guinea- 
Bissau
Republic of 
Korea
Russian 
Federation
Military activities  
(lit. b)
X
X
X
X
(X)
(X)
(X)
X
X
X
Law enforcement  
activities in the EEZ 
(lit. b)
X
X
X
X
(X)
(X)
(X)
X
X
X
UN Security Council 
exercising its functions 
(lit. c)
X
X
X
(X)
(X)
(X)
X
X
X
Delimitation and  
historic bays or titles 
(lit. a)
X
X
X
(X)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
(X)
(X)
(X)
X
X
X
State
Spain
Thailand
Tunisia
Ukraine
Uruguay
Togo
Military activities  
(lit. b)
X
X
X
Law enforcement  
activities in the EEZ 
(lit. b)
X
X
X
UN Security Council 
exercising its functions 
(lit. c)
X
X
X
Delimitation and  
historic bays or titles 
(lit. a)
X
X
X
X
X
United 
Kingdom
X X X
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